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 The Limits on Congress’s Power To Do Nothing: 
A Preliminary Inquiry 
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL* 
The subject of this Essay may seem anachronistic to some: the constitutional 
implications of congressional obstruction, a matter typified by the Republican 
Congress’s opposition to the Obama administration during six of its eight years in 
office. After all, we are now living in a period of an ostensibly united government 
under a Trump presidency and a Republican Congress, a phenomenon that, as other 
writers in the symposium point out, raises its own set of constitutional concerns.  
Nevertheless, the problem of congressional obstruction is one that is likely to 
return to the constitutional landscape.1 The country’s equally divided electorate, 
combined with the nation’s intense polarization, means that we can fully expect 
future episodes of divided government and more prolonged periods when the 
Congress, no matter which party controls it, will be intent upon using whatever 
tactics may be available to frustrate the agenda of the opposing party’s presidency.2 
Further, even if polarization somehow subsides at the grassroots, the dynamic of 
the permanent campaign will continue to foster congressional obstruction. When 
each party views each other’s successes as damaging to their own electoral 
prospects, there is little room for cross-aisle cooperation.3 
President Obama’s response to congressional obstruction was to adopt a “we 
can’t wait” strategy under which he strived to pursue as much of his agenda as he 
could unilaterally, without waiting for Congress to assent.4 That approach, 
however, generated serious criticism on grounds that it exacerbated an already 
dangerous trend of centering too much power in the presidency.5 Congress, after all, 
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 1. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized 
Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 326 (2011) (“I see no institutional or legal 
changes that could overcome the paralysis that will characterize divided government, amidst 
polarized parties, in the coming years.”).  
 2. See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2013) (describing the modern legislature as being “defined 
by heightened partisanship”).  
 3. See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN 23–24 (1982) (discussing 
how concern for the next election, rather than long-term results, motivates current politics); 
Pildes, supra note 1, at 330–31 (“[H]yperpolarized parties are likely to yield little more than 
legislative gridlock and paralysis.”); see also Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, 
Finding the Common Good in an Era of Dysfunctional Governance, DAEDALUS, Spring 
2013, at 15, 18 (“[T]he two major political parties in recent decades have become 
increasingly homogeneous and have moved toward ideological poles.”).  
 4. Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, 
Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 3 (2014) (“[W]e 
can’t wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I 
will.”) (quoting President Obama).  
 5. See Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is 
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1194 (2014) (“The President’s opponents naturally decry 
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provides the primary bulwark against presidential overreaching,6 and the argument 
that the presidency should assume more power because Congress is using its 
prerogatives to check executive authority seems exactly backward.7 If Congress is to 
serve its checking function, it would seem that, at the least, it should have the 
authority not to accede to executive branch direction.8 At least on one level, then, 
Congress has, and should have, the power to do nothing. 
The problem of congressional obstruction that President Obama faced, however, 
also has serious constitutional overtones. First, as history has demonstrated, congres-
sional obstruction often means that Presidents will “push the envelope” when their 
agenda is frustrated. 9 President Obama was not the first in this respect, and he un-
doubtedly will not be the last. (Indeed, as this Essay was going to press, President 
Trump announced that he will also use unilateral executive action to overcome con-
gressional inaction.10) 
In part, presidents “push the envelope” because of the truth in the old maxim that 
power abhors a vacuum.11 In part, however, they do so because of expectations.  
When only the presidency is able to take major governmental action, the expectation  
                                                                                                                 
 
each round of administrative fixes, arguing that he lacks respect for the rule of law and has 
become a tyrant.”); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 
773, 781 (2014) (“Since the middle of the twentieth century, presidential power has expanded 
at a dramatic rate, and that expansion continues unabated.”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1819–20 (1996) (describing the trend toward 
increasing executive power, and arguing that this trend is a threat to originalists and function-
alists alike). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing the expansion of presidential power). 
 6. See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary 
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013) (describing the potent congressional 
checks against the executive branch); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 715, 768, 772–73 (2012) (arguing that Congress’s “hard” and “soft” powers allow 
it to “vigorously assert itself against the other two branches”).  
 7. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 772–73 (describing the constitutional powers and checks 
intentionally allocated to Congress). 
 8. Id. (stating that “the separation of powers requires that the branches maintain the 
institutional capacity to assert themselves against one another”) (emphasis omitted) (footnote 
omitted).  
 9. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50 
IND. L. REV. 281, 325 (2016) (“The worse Congressional gridlock becomes, the more presi-
dents push the envelope of what they can do within the executive branch . . . .”).  
 10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2017, 7:30 AM), https:// 
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/917698839846576130 [https://perma.cc/AH8F-MDWK] 
(“Since Congress can’t get its act together on HealthCare, I will be using the power of the pen 
to give great HealthCare to many people—FAST.”). What is particularly notable about 
President Trump’s tweet is that it suggests that it is permissible for a President to use unilateral 
action to circumvent congressional inaction even when his own party controls Congress. 
 11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (arguing that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, 
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility”); see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 1193–95 (arguing that when Congress does 
not wield its legislative power, the President “begins to take on increasing responsibility for 
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becomes that the executive is the appropriate branch to take major government ac-
tion.12 It therefore becomes politically more difficult to claim that a President is 
overreaching when he acts unilaterally. Equally significantly, it also becomes more 
politically difficult for the President to refuse to act.13 As such, the exercise of pres-
idential authority builds on itself.14 The lesson of history is that, in the long run, 
congressional obstruction tends to empower the presidency rather than weaken it;15 
this further exacerbates the power gulf between the President and the Congress.16 
Second, constitutional concerns may also arise if a President does not act in re-
sponse to an obstructionist Congress. While accumulating too much power in the 
presidency creates the danger of tyranny coming in through the front door in the form 
of an imperial presidency, a dysfunctional government that does not respond to the 
needs of its citizenry creates the danger of tyranny coming in through the back. A 
society that has lost faith in its institutions is vulnerable to totalitarian appeals and 
intervention.17  
The Constitution, arguably, was concerned with both types of threats.18 The 
Framers, of course, famously designed the Constitution to foster a system of checks 
and balances in which none of the three branches would be able to amass and exercise 
too much power.19 But the Framers also endeavored to create a Constitution that 
                                                                                                                 
 
solving problems of domestic as well as foreign policy”). 
 12. See Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Constitutional Qualms or Politics as 
Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 335, 336–
37 (2017) (attributing the President’s ability to act unilaterally to both public support and to 
Congress’s inability to unite in defense of separation of powers); see also Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1006–07 (2008) (arguing 
that “public constitutional sentiment” often dictates which branch will act in a given situation). 
 13. See Steven G. Calabresi, Book Review, “The Era of Big Government is Over,” 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY, NELSON W. POLSBY & 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1997)) (arguing that a President’s inability to meet expectations will lead to the perception 
that his presidency has failed).  
 14. See William P. Marshall, Why the Assertion of a “Nationalist” Presidency Does Not 
Support Claims for Expansive Presidential Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 563 (2010). 
 15. See Teter, supra note 6, at 2222 (analyzing executive usurpation of legislative power, 
such as when the War Powers Resolution is not enforced by Congress, thereby expanding 
executive authority in an area shared by the legislature); see also Josh Chafetz, The 
Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2083–84 (2013) (analyzing 
President Obama’s use of recess appointments in response to congressional obstruction).  
 16. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 40 (arguing that the modern presidency has an advantage 
over the other branches, because “the White House staff can create sweeping changes that will 
be very hard to reverse once they are set in motion”); see also Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1816–
24 (detailing the modern imbalance of power between the legislative and executive branches, 
and arguing that there is a great disparity between the Founders’ characterization of executive 
power and the current political landscape). 
 17. Cf. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 18. Neil Siegel, The Essential Functions of the National Government in the Collective 
Action Constitution 2 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[T]he great 
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists 
162 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:159 
 
would work.20 Congressional action (or inaction) that imperils the ability of the gov-
ernment to function also raises constitutional concerns.21 
It is therefore appropriate to examine whether there may be, or should be, limits 
on Congress’s power to do nothing.22 Concededly, the case for finding such limita-
tions is not easy. As Part I of this Essay will show, arguments for limiting Congress’s 
authority to do nothing are not readily found in history, text, or constitutional struc-
ture. Part I concludes, however, that the need for establishing some constitutional 
limits on congressional inaction is nevertheless compelling because of the serious-
ness of the dangers involved. Accordingly, Part II goes on to advance an approach 
that would limit Congress’s power to do nothing in certain circumstances. 
Specifically, Part II proposes an approach that would limit Congress’s power to do 
nothing based on the type of power that Congress is (or is not) exercising. Congress 
could not refuse to act when the exercise of the power in question is necessary for 
the government to function, such as appropriations or appointments; but it may refuse 
to act on matters such as legislation that do not raise functionality concerns.  Part III 
addresses some possible objections to this thesis. Part IV presents a brief conclusion. 
I. CONGRESS’S POWER TO DO NOTHING 
The case in favor of finding a constitutional obligation for Congress to act is not 
initially promising.23 As a historical matter, “Do-Nothing” Congresses are not a new 
phenomenon. President Truman most notably used the term in his battles with 
                                                                                                                 
 
in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”). 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the various defects of the 
Articles of Confederation), NO. 62, at 314 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting that 
difficulty in passing legislation “may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial”). 
 21. See Siegel, supra note 18. 
 22. To date, the most significant work on this subject has been done by Michael Teter. 
See Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435 (2014); Teter, supra note 2; Teter, supra note 6. Teter’s work focuses 
on the concept of arbitrary inaction, meaning inaction that is not based upon deliberative policy 
choices. In contrast, the approach offered here concentrates on the distinction between 
Congress’s nonexercise of powers that are necessary to government functionality and those 
that are not. See infra notes 57–79 and accompanying text. 
 23. As a number of commentators have pointed out, not all “inaction” is the same. Teter, 
for example, distinguishes between nonarbitrary and arbitrary inaction, the latter being “when 
Congress fails to act on a matter within its constitutional domain, and such failure lacks a 
proper motivational or factual basis or is the exercise of discretionary power that involves no 
clear standards or explanation.” Teter, supra note 22, at 1441. Franita Tolson distinguishes 
permissible gridlock from excessive gridlock, the latter being when there is broad political 
agreement about a course of action but party loyalty stymies any attempt at compromise. 
Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional Gridlock as State 
Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2272 (2013). Josh Chafetz, in turn, differenti-
ates between “legislative inaction resulting from the lack of an adequate public consensus 
behind a particular course of action, on the one hand, and legislative inaction resulting from 
some procedural roadblock or dysfunction internal to our political institutions, on the other.” 
Chafetz, supra note 15, at 2075. 
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Congress during the late 1940s,24 but descriptions of Congress as Do-Nothing have 
been around since at least the nineteenth century.25 More significantly, the critique 
that a particular Congress is not acting responsively or responsibly goes back even 
further. Attacks on Congress for not acting are as old as the Congress itself.26  
Congressional inaction of the type witnessed during the Obama years, where such 
inaction was designed with the specific purpose to make the President fail,27 also has 
historical precedent.28 During the presidency of Martin Van Buren, for example, 
Congress endeavored to block the efforts of the President to extricate the country 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See President Harry S. Truman, Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech (July 15, 
1948) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/links/truman 
_speech.html [https://perma.cc/B4EN-9ZB2]); President Harry S. Truman, Know Nothing, 
Do Nothing Congress (Oct. 7, 1948) (transcript available at http://www.speeches-
usa.com/Transcripts/harry_truman-nothing.html [https://perma.cc/S8UH-VBMB]). 
 25. See, e.g., Bill of Indictment Against Congress, CADIZ SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1867, at 1 
(arguing that the efforts of the Congress to impeach Andrew Johnson were wrong in light of 
Congress’s failure to act to prevent national crises); The Do-Nothing Congress—A Late 
Session, NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Mar. 2, 1876 (criticizing the Congress for a particularly 
unproductive session). The denunciation of Congress as “Do-Nothing” was also occasionally 
raised by members of Congress themselves. See The Work of Congress, NEW-YORK TRIBUNE, 
Apr. 16, 1880, at 1 (quoting then-Senator James G. Blaine); see also Fifty-Second Congress. An 
Analysis of Its Work Presented by Representative Henderson., RECORD-UNION, Mar. 11, 1893. 
 26. R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” Is Not Our 
Central Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 789–
90 (2014) (describing the legislative gridlock during James Madison’s presidency as even 
more intense than the current level of partisanship in Congress); see Sarah A. Binder, The 
Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 519 (1999) (showing 
that complaints about gridlock in American politics predate the Constitution); see also David 
W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical Perspective, in 1 RED 
AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 119, 
120 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (“For many years, our political institu-
tions and policymaking processes have withstood sharp divisions between the parties. In fact, 
the early history of the two-party political system in the United States exhibited much more 
colorful anecdotes about polarization.”). 
 27. See Glenn Kessler, When Did Mitch McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a 
‘One-Term President’?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-obama-a-one-term-
president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html [https://perma.cc 
/B5MA-F69M] (describing McConnell’s explicitly partisan statement that a one-term 
presidency for Obama should be the GOP’s top priority); see also ROBERT DRAPER, DO NOT 
ASK WHAT GOOD WE DO: INSIDE THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES xvii–xix (2012) 
(quoting Republican Representative Kevin McCarthy as saying, “We’ve gotta challenge 
[Democrats] on every single bill,” and noting that top House Republicans met the night of 
President Obama’s inauguration to devise a plan to “mortally wound” President Obama 
through “united and unyielding opposition”). 
 28. Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional 
Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1704 (2015) (“[T]he turn of the nineteenth century 
saw comparably high levels of conflict between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, as 
well as familiar patterns that included ‘increased partisan polarization, spreading over new 
dimensions of politics and policy,’ ‘close electoral parity between the two parties,’ and ruth-
less strategic behavior to gain electoral advantage.”). 
164 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:159 
 
from an economic crisis solely in order to further its own partisan agenda.29 History, 
then, provides very little support for the argument that congressional inaction is, or 
can be, unconstitutional. Congressional inaction has simply been too prevalent in our 
nation’s history.30  
Constitutional text also does not easily support the argument that Congress has a 
duty to act. The text, rather, imposes very few obligations on the Congress. Article I 
mandates that the House of Representatives must choose a speaker and other offi-
cers;31 and that the Senate must choose other officers and a president pro tempore in 
the absence of the Vice President.32 It also demands that each house must be “the 
Judge of the Elections”33 and keep a journal of its proceedings.34 It further requires 
that Congress from time to time publish a statement and account of receipts and ex-
penditures of all public money,35 and that it appropriate money for the armed forces.36 
Article V provides that Congress must call a convention for proposing constitutional 
amendments upon application of two-thirds of the states.37 Article VI mandates that 
Senators and Representatives be “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the] 
Constitution.”38 The Twelfth Amendment states that both houses must be present 
while the President of the Senate opens all the certificates and counts the votes for 
President.39 The 20th Amendment requires that Congress assemble at least once a 
year.40 The 25th Amendment instructs that Congress must decide whether the 
President is unfit for duty if “the Vice President and a majority of either the principal 
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide” transmit to it a “written declaration that the President is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office.”41 Congress, of course, has a multitude of other 
powers; but beyond meeting these relatively minimal requirements, its exercise of 
those powers is essentially optional. 
Constitutional structure also cuts against the conclusion that Congress has a duty 
to act. After all, the Constitution presupposes that Congress will check the executive. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 4–11 (2013) (noting Whig Party efforts to obstruct the agenda of 
President Martin Van Buren). 
 30. See Binder, supra note 26; Melnick, supra note 26; see also Brady & Han, supra note 
26, at 120; JOHN J. PATRICK, RICHARD M. PIOUS & DONALD A. RITCHIE, THE OXFORD GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 240 (2002) (noting that “[e]ven in the 1st Congress, 
minority members delivered long speeches and used the rules to obstruct legislation they op-
posed.”).  
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 32. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.  
 33. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 34. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 35. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 36. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 37. Id. art. V. 
 38. Id. art. VI, § 3.  
 39. Id. amend. XII. 
 40. Id. amend. XX, § 2 (amending U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 which also required that 
Congress assemble once a year albeit on a different date. Both provisions, however, allowed 
Congress to adjust the date from the specific date set forth in the text). 
 41. Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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Obstructing a President’s agenda, therefore, may simply be a matter of Congress do-
ing its job.42 To be sure, this structural argument may not be as straightforward as it 
originally seems. As Michael Teter points out, certain types of congressional inaction 
can also arguably raise structural concerns because Congress’s failure to act can 
mean that it is not performing its checking function.43 Teter therefore distinguishes 
between Congress’s refusal to take action because of deliberative choice and its fail-
ure to act because of its inability to make substantive policy decisions—the latter of 
which he describes as unconstitutional “arbitrary inaction.”44 Yet even this insight 
does not deny that an allowance for purposeful congressional inaction is an essential 
part of the constitutional structure.  
The argument from constitutional structure also identifies a definitional concern 
inherent in the position that congressional inaction can be unconstitutional. At what 
point does Congress’s proper constitutional exercise of its checking function turn 
into improper congressional obstructionism?45 The difficulty of this determination is 
no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the constitutional goals of checking power and 
simultaneously allowing for effective use of that power are inevitably in tension.46 A 
President focused on making government work will be motivated to take actions that 
circumvent congressional blockage.47 A Congress intent on blocking the President 
will take actions (or inactions) that could lead to situations in which the government 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2107 
(2013) (describing a former senator’s position that intentional legislative gridlock in opposi-
tion to the Affordable Care Act was a “constitutional necessity”); see also Jeff Jacoby, 
Gridlock, or Democracy as Intended?, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 25, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe 
.com/opinion/2011/12/25/gridlock-democracy-intended/EJlqriPsRHqeW9wxlAhtMK/story 
.html [https://perma.cc/N656-A6DR] (arguing that the current state of gridlock is simply a 
functional norm, intended by the Framers). 
 43. Teter, supra note 6, at 2222 (“Congress cannot perform [its] checking function if it 
cannot make deliberative decisions.”); see also Teter, supra note 2, at 1138 (“[I]f Congress 
cannot act, it cannot effectively check the executive—or the judiciary—when the other 
branch extends beyond its authority or impairs Congress's ability to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibilities.”). 
 44. Teter, supra note 6, at 2218 (“If Congress chooses to maintain the status quo or if the 
Senate decides to reject a nominee, that amounts to a substantive decision. But that’s not what 
is happening. With increasing frequency, Congress fails to make policy decisions.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 45. See Tolson, supra note 23, at 2272 (2013) (“Although our current system is an obvi-
ous departure from the Madisonian ideal, distinguishing ‘permissible’ levels of gridlock from 
gridlock that is ‘excessive’ and therefore unconstitutional remains difficult.”); see also David 
E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 41 (2014) (arguing that 
the result of congressional gridlock is “a widespread fear that the breakdown of certain sepa-
ration-of-powers conventions is contributing to a breakdown of our system of representative 
government”). 
 46. Teter, supra note 2, at 1114 (stating that the concepts of separation of powers and the 
checking power “are, at least facially, at odds with each other”). 
 47. See Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 3–6 (describing the gradual expansion of the 
President’s administrative authority in response to partisan legislative gridlock); see also 
Marshall, supra note 5, at 776–77 (describing President Obama’s strategy to “circumvent the 
gridlock in Congress and accomplish several domestic policy initiatives through the unilateral 
exercise of executive power”).  
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is disabled from accomplishing its basic functions (consider, for example, the battles 
over whether Congress should raise the debt ceiling in order to pay for its already-
accumulated debts).48  
Further, any attempt to draw a line between Congress’s appropriate exercise of its 
checking function and improper obstructionism will necessarily be hampered by the 
difficulty in overcoming partisan perspectives. Many who condemned the 
Republican Congress as obstructing the agenda of President Obama might very well 
praise the use of those same tactics to combat the agenda of President Trump as ex-
amples of Congress acting according to its highest calling.49 Conversely, many who 
saw the Republican efforts to battle President Obama as examples of Congress acting 
appropriately might very well see similar Democratic efforts to oppose President 
Trump as obstruction (in fact, the Senate majority leader and principal architect of 
the Republican efforts to frustrate President Obama’s presidency has made exactly 
this claim).50 Distinguishing between partisan and constitutionally based criticism of 
congressional inaction is therefore unlikely to be easy. Determinations of 
unconstitutional inaction, in short, then will inevitably raise the concern of a lack of 
manageable standards.51 
Finally, any theory setting forth a constitutional obligation for Congress to act 
would raise a host of enforcement concerns. Is such a doctrine justiciable?52 Could 
courts compel the legislature to act without raising serious separation of powers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 5, at 1176 (characterizing the debt ceiling crisis of 2011 
and the government shutdown of 2013, at least in part, as attempts “to weaken and humiliate 
the President of the opposition party”). 
 49. See Rachel Dicker, The Internet Wants Congress to #DoYourJob and Consider 
Merrick Garland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 17, 2016, 12:46 PM), https://www.usnews 
.com/news/articles/2016-03-17/doyourjob-hashtag-asks-congress-to-consider-merrick-garland-
for-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/TW5C-A6TY] (discussing Senator Chuck Schumer’s 
condemnation of the Republicans’ partisan filibuster of President Obama’s Supreme Court 
nomination). But see Robert Barnes, Ed O’Keefe & Ann E. Marimow, Schumer: Democrats 
Will Filibuster Gorsuch Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-to-focus-today-on-testimony-
from-friends-foes/2017/03/23/14d21116-0fc7-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/R7PL-JZPB] (discussing Senator Chuck Schumer’s role in leading the partisan 
filibuster of President Trump’s Supreme Court nomination). 
 50. Compare Kessler, supra note 27 (citing Senator McConnell’s statement that making 
Obama a one-term President should be the GOP’s top priority), with Cristian Farias, Mitch 
McConnell Says Americans Won’t Tolerate Democrats Blocking Supreme Court Nominations, 
HUFFPOST (Jan. 4, 2017, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mitch-mcconnell-
merrick-garland-supreme-court_us_586d6720e4b0c4be0af2bd3a [https://perma.cc/2LHL-
TX5H] (noting McConnell’s criticism of  Democrats as obstructionists for opposing President 
Trump’s opportunity to nominate a Supreme Court even though McConnell had refused to 
hold a vote on President Obama’s nominee). 
 51. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that constitutional standards 
need to be manageable in order to allow for judicial review). But see Teter, supra note 22, at 
1472–75 (arguing that, while the “manageable standards” requirement of the political question 
doctrine is certainly an obstacle, it ultimately should not prevent a justiciable challenge to 
congressional inaction). 
 52. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1472–75. 
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concerns?53 If it were concluded that there was a nonjudicially enforceable obligation 
for Congress to act, would that have any effect? 
These concerns notwithstanding, the project of finding limits on Congress’s 
power to do nothing is critical for a number of reasons. The first is the most basic. 
Federal government dysfunction can threaten the provision of basic services and na-
tional security (as could occur in the case of a government shutdown).54 
Congressional inaction can therefore literally place the nation at risk. 
Second, a theory of a congressional obligation to act may be necessary to prevent 
the further expansion of presidential power. As noted above, there is irony in the use 
of congressional obstruction as a weapon against presidential overreach. It tends to 
increase presidential power in the long run.55 Finding constitutional limits on 
Congress’s power to do nothing, in short, may paradoxically serve to lessen, rather 
than increase, the expanse of presidential power.  
Third, and more pragmatically, a theory of a congressional obligation to act may 
be necessary to provide a constitutional backstop against further dysfunction. At pre-
sent, the pressures of polarization are so forceful that even members of Congress who 
might otherwise work across the aisle are deterred from doing so.56 In such a political 
environment, where politicians need excuses to work with each other, setting a 
constitutional standard for congressional behavior might provide some political 
cover for bipartisan action.  
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to investigate whether a workable theory can be  
constructed that posits that Congress has a constitutional duty to act, at least in 
some circumstances. The next Part offers such an approach.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. But see id. at 1460–61 (arguing that judicial review of potentially arbitrary inaction 
by Congress would actually support constitutional notions of separation of powers and inter-
branch accountability).  
 54. For a synopsis of the 2013 U.S. government shutdown’s negative effects on govern-
ment entities responsible for public health (including the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), see Raina M. Merchant, Commentary, The 2013 US Government Shutdown 
(#Shutdown) and Health: An Emerging Role for Social Media, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2248, 
2248–49 (2014); see also Cal Woodward, Shutdown Hits Health Services, but Obamacare 
Steams on, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N 1390, 1390 (2013) (describing the U.S. government’s 
shutdown as “delivering a blow to medical research, dampening disease detection and keeping 
the gravely ill out of potentially life-saving clinical trials”). 
 55. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Jonathan Martin & Kenneth P. Vogel, Trump Backers ‘Furious’ That Senator 
Stood Against Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/06/30/us/politics/heller-trump-health-care-adelson-wynn.html [https://perma.cc/736F-
T322] (discussing the condemnation of Senator Dean Heller by his fellow Republicans for his 
refusal to support the conservative replacement for the Affordable Care Act); see also Mark 
A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a 
Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 645 (2014) (“The goal of most 
successful constitutional reforms in the United States is to entrench the existing structure of 
political competition and align other constitutional practices so that the dominant political 
forces can operate the constitutional order more effectively.”). 
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II. A THEORY OF CONGRESS’S DUTY TO ACT: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWERS 
There is a difference between Congress’s failing to act on a President’s favored 
piece of legislation (including those that enjoy popular support) and Congress’s fail-
ure to pass a budget. The former may result in the maintenance of bad policy; the 
latter may lead to a government shutdown. All inactions do not have the same con-
sequences.  
I begin with this understanding as a starting point for determining when congres-
sional inaction should be deemed unconstitutional. The constitutionality of congres-
sional inaction should be determined by reference to the specific type of congres-
sional power involved and the consequences of that power’s nonexercise, and not on 
the basis of how purportedly egregious the congressional behavior in question ap-
pears to be.57 Specifically, and preliminarily, I would suggest that congressional fail-
ure to act on appropriations58 or, in the case of the Senate, its failure to consider 
presidential appointments under its advise and consent authority,59 should be subject 
to constitutional scrutiny. Its failure to take legislative action, as when it refuses to 
sign on to a President’s particular policy agenda and enact his proposed legislation, 
should be constitutionally unobjectionable. (I leave for later discussion whether other 
congressional powers, such as its oversight and investigatory authority or its powers 
over war and national security, should or could also trigger constitutional scrutiny 
when Congress fails to act.) 
The primary basis for this distinction is straightforward. Congressional inaction 
in the areas of appropriations and appointments threatens the ability of the govern-
ment to function. The government cannot run without funding,60 and it cannot 
operate without leadership.61 As such, inaction with respect to either the budget62 or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. But see Chafetz, supra note 15, at 2075 (differentiating between inaction which em-
anates from a lack of adequate public consensus and that which results from some internal 
dysfunction); Teter, supra note 22, at 1441 (distinguishing between nonarbirtary and arbitrary 
inaction); Tolson, supra note 23, at 2268–69 (distinguishing between permissive and exces-
sive gridlock). 
 58. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 725 (noting that appropriations laws are different from 
other bills in that “their passage is necessary to the continued functioning of the entire govern-
ment”); see also Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least 
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling 
Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (2012) (arguing that congressional polarization and 
inaction will lead to “budgetary gridlock forcing the president to take actions that test consti-
tutional limits”). 
 59. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1513, 1559–60 (2015) (noting that the congressional obstruction of presidential 
appointments inhibits the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws); see 
also Teter, supra note 6, at 2229 (arguing that Congress’s arbitrary inaction with respect to 
presidential appointments goes against notions of constitutional fairness).  
 60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.    
 62. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345–46 (1988) 
(arguing that a passive approach to appropriations might be unconstitutional in some cases, 
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appointments arguably abdicates Congress’s core responsibility to maintain and 
preserve the government.63 In contrast, the government can continue to operate in the 
absence of new legislation.64 Therefore, inaction on legislation, while it may amount 
to bad policy or bad government, does not undercut the viability of the state itself.  
Second, drawing the line between appropriations and appointments on one side 
and legislation on the other is also supported by separation of powers concerns. 
Appropriations and appointments are necessary for the President to be able to fulfill 
his duties, including his obligation to “take care” the laws are faithfully executed.65 
New legislation is not. Holding back on appropriations and appointments thus 
crosses into matters within the domain of the executive in a way that holding back 
legislation does not. To be sure, Presidents have increasingly taken on the role as 
“legislator-in-chief,”66 and one can understand why a President might criticize a 
Congress for blocking his legislative agenda. Yet from a separation of powers per-
spective, the notion that a legislature can obstruct a President’s legislative agenda is 
fundamentally misplaced. Article I vests the legislative power in the Congress.67 
Article II gives the President only the right to make recommendations.68  
Third, separating categories of powers in which congressional inaction can be un-
constitutional and those in which it cannot may also have the unexpected advantage 
of curbing presidential power. As it stands now, presidents can (and do) argue that 
Congress has not acted in passing needed legislation as a justification for engaging 
in unilateral action.69 That, indeed, was the central argument underlying President 
Obama’s “we can’t wait” strategy.70 It was also the reason offered by President 
George H. W. Bush in moving forward without congressional authorization in his 
initiative to fund faith-based organizations;71 and, most recently, the justification 
                                                                                                                 
 
and that “Congress has not only the power but also the duty to exercise legislative control over 
federal expenditures”). 
 63. See David Schoenbrod, How to Salvage Article I: The Crumbling Foundation of Our 
Republic, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 665 (arguing that Article I intentionally assigns 
Congress the power and duty to decide the most overarching policy issues). 
 64. In fact, as some leading constitutional theorists have argued, obstructing legislation 
can at times be beneficial. See Gerhardt, supra note 42, at 2107–08 (noting that Justice Scalia 
believed that gridlock was intended by the framers in order to prevent excessive legislation 
and quoting Scalia as stating: “God bless gridlock.”). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 66. See Schoenbrod, supra note 63, at 678 (noting that the President’s legislative power 
has steadily grown, just as Congress’s legislative accountability and power has steadily 
decreased). 
 67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
 68. Id. art. II, § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the 
State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient . . . .”). 
 69. Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that recent congressional gridlock has 
encouraged the White House to use unilateral action “in the service of partisan objectives”).  
 70. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 71. Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 4; Georgia A. Persons, Administrative Policy 
Initiatives and the Limits of Change: Lessons from the Implementation of the Bush Faith-
Based and Community Initiative, 39 POL. & POL’Y 949, 950 (2011).  
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set forth by President Trump for acting unilaterally in undoing portions of the 
Affordable Care Act.72 Establishing that Congress is within its legitimate 
prerogatives not to act on legislative matters, however, would take this rationale 
for unilateral action off the President’s desk.  
Fourth, breaking down the constitutionality of congressional inaction into 
categories has the collateral benefit of providing a more effective incentive to 
motivate Congress to break gridlock. A particularized assertion that an entity has 
failed to perform a specific constitutionally required duty is a more powerful 
argument than is a general condemnation that the entity has simply failed to do its 
job. General criticisms sound in hyperbole. Specific critiques have bite. Further, as 
business management theory instructs, setting forth specific, clearly defined goals 
is a better way to both motivate actors and hold them accountable for their results  
than are general directives.73 
Fifth, and for largely the same reasons, to the extent that a particular battle over 
the constitutionality of congressional inaction is fought politically rather than 
through the courts (a matter that will be discussed subsequently), the narrow claim 
that Congress has failed to perform a specific constitutional duty would have 
greater resonance than would a general attack on Congress as obstructionist. To be 
sure, one could argue that the battle over the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland 
to the United States Supreme Court disproves this point. After all, in that instance, 
the constitutional claim was made narrowly—specifically that the Congress 
violated a specific and constitutionally imposed duty to give a Supreme Court 
nominee a hearing.74 Perhaps. Yet, it is also true that the attack on Congress for its 
inaction on Judge Garland was presented against a background of multiple attacks 
on Congress for purportedly unconstitutional inaction on a wide range of matters.75 
It is therefore also possible that the power of the argument that Congress was 
violating its constitutional duty by not acting was weakened by overuse.  
Sixth, distinguishing between congressional inaction that threatens the govern-
ment’s ability to operate and inaction that does not impair government functionality 
arguably makes sense jurisprudentially. As noted above, any claim that congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Trump, supra note 10. Two days after sending this tweet, President Trump signed an 
executive order ending the federal subsidy program for health insurance companies that in-
sured low-income people and ending requirements that insurers on the health care exchange 
provide certain benefits—policy changes that health experts said could unravel the Affordable 
Care Act.  Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman & Reed Abelson, Trump to Scrap Critical Health 
Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-obamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html 
[https://perma.cc/UW4M-R4XR].  
 73. Peter F. Drucker, Managing the Public Service Institution, PUB. INT., Fall 1973, at 
43, 49. 
 74. David M. Herszenhorn, Merrick Garland Battle Moves to Home Front as Senate 
Recesses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/us/politics 
/merrick-garland-supreme-court-senate-recess.html [https://perma.cc/U4GM-NL2R] (quoting 
Senator Jon Tester as saying that refusing to vote on Garland’s nomination is equal to “not 
following the Constitution”). 
 75. See Pozen, supra note 45, at 6 (citing the various obstruction-related criticisms by the 
Obama administration against Senate Republicans). 
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inaction is unconstitutional runs into a considerable headwind, as it is not easily sup-
ported by history, text, or structure.76 It therefore follows that claims of unconstitu-
tionality, if they are to succeed at all, need to be both narrowly drawn and extraordi-
narily well justified. Setting the line based on whether congressional inaction 
threatens the government’s ability to function meets these criteria.77 
Finally, and undoubtedly most wistfully, instructing Congress that it has a consti-
tutional duty to act in certain circumstances might serve to change political culture. 
The position that congressional action is optional sends the message that there is no 
need for members to work together because there are no common responsibilities. 
The notion that Congress has a duty to act, on the other hand, tells the members that 
they have common goals and common obligations. Such an understanding then could 
be helpful in turning members away from the mindset of separation of parties that 
currently dominates political culture78 to one in which they have greater institutional 
identification.79 If so, such a change in orientation could serve to reinvigorate sepa-
ration of powers.  
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
There are, of course, a multitude of arguments against the approach advocated in 
this Essay. This Part will attempt to respond to some of the more likely challenges. 
The first and primary objection has already been mentioned. It is difficult to discern 
an obligation for Congress to act from the existing jurisprudence. The claim that 
Congress has such a duty, therefore, would require moving the needle. I readily cede 
this point, although I would suggest that drawing the line for when congressional 
inaction threatens government functionality does not move the needle too far, given 
the inherent constitutional mandate that elected officers have a fundamental obliga-
tion to preserve the republic.80 
A second objection might be that finding Congress has a constitutional duty to act 
would further weaken the Congress in its battles with the President. The power of 
the purse and the power to resist presidential appointments are two of the strongest 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. See supra notes 23–44 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1257 (2004) (arguing that unusual or even extraconstitutional actions must be taken if the 
constitutional order is in jeopardy). 
 78. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313 (2006) (discussing how Congressional members’ loyalty to their 
party rather than loyalty to their branches has weakened the role of separation of powers in 
checking government power). But see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28–33 
(2017) (arguing that separation of powers has not been weakened to the degree that Levinson 
and Pildes suggest).  
 79. See George K. Yin, Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2287, 2303–06 (2013) (discussing nonpartisan staff on congressional committees as a 
method for reducing gridlock and promoting cross-aisle cohesion). 
 80. Cf.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound 
by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”).  See generally Schoenbrod, supra 
note 63 (arguing that the legislators must return to the constitutionally inherent sense of re-
sponsibility that the Framers intended). 
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weapons in Congress’s arsenal.81 Suggesting that there are constitutional limits on 
these powers would arguably take away some of Congress’s most potent leverage in 
its interbranch disputes. This objection has substantial merit as well, although only 
to a point. Concluding that Congress has a duty to act in these areas does not mean 
that it has to give in to the President in every instance; it only means that there are 
constitutional limits on its right of inaction. Further, as noted previously, the ap-
proach suggested here would also empower Congress in the legislative arena because 
it would confirm that Congress has no obligation to consider or enact legislation. As 
such, it would make clear that a President does not have the right to act unilaterally 
on legislative matters because of congressional inaction.82  
Third, it would likely be argued that there are, and can be, no clear standards to 
determine when congressional inaction runs afoul of constitutional limits. 
Presumably, a congressional refusal to meet with a President to discuss a budget 
might be considered improper obstruction; but would (or should) the failure to come 
to agreement with the President be considered congressional obstruction if the failure 
to agree is based in good faith?83 Further, if good faith is to be the standard, how is 
it to be determined when Congress is acting in good faith and when it is not?  
These undoubtedly are serious concerns. Nevertheless, some direction is possible. 
For example, with respect to appointments, a requirement that the Senate has to give 
a presidential nominee a hearing within a reasonable amount of time provides a work-
able standard.84 Similarly, a rule prohibiting the blocking of a nominee because of 
objections to some executive branch policy having nothing to do with the prospective 
nominee’s responsibilities, as occurred when Senator Jesse Helms held up a vote on 
Winston Lord as ambassador to China85 or when Senator Mary Landrieu prevented 
a vote on Jack Lew for OMB Director,86 is easily applied.87 Just as clear would be a 
prohibition on voting against (or not voting on) a nominee, not because of any ob-
jections to that nominee, but because of an objection to the office to which that nom-
inee has been appointed. Refusing to confirm a nominee because of opposition to the 
existence of the agency rather than to the nominee himself, for example, is an action 
more designed to repeal already enacted legislation than it is an action consistent 
with the Senate’s obligation to appraise the merits of a nominee.88 Comparable rules 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See Pozen, supra note 45, at 14–15 (describing Congress’s appropriations and ap-
pointment powers as being among its most formidable); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 78, at 
45–151 (discussing Congress’s appropriation and appointment powers). 
 82. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 772–73 (supporting the notion that one branch must be 
allowed to check another in good faith, but arguing that this should be done judiciously). 
 84. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1482. 
 85. See Martin Tolchin, Helms Bars Envoy, Demanding Reagan Halt Abortion Aid, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 1, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/01/us/helms-bars-envoy-demanding 
-reagan-halt-abortion-aid.html [https://perma.cc/HA8S-3UJ3]. 
 86. This example is noted in Teter, supra note 22, at 1487. 
 87. But see CHAFETZ, supra note 78, at 134 (citing the example of blocking nominees 
because of objections to some executive branch policy having nothing to do with the prospec-
tive nominee’s responsibilities, as a “capacious,” but apparently permissible, use of 
Congress’s appointments powers).  
 88. See id. at 1449 (discussing congressional inaction on the nomination of Richard 
Cordray to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also Ylan Q. Mui, Senate 
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would also make sense when dealing with appropriations issues. No votes or 
nonvotes should have to be tied to the merits of the specific appropriations proposals 
and not to a matter fully extraneous to the substance of the appropriations bill.89  
More difficult will be determining unconstitutionality in instances in which the 
basis for inaction is less straightforward. The question as to whether a particular con-
gressional inaction is “arbitrary” versus “non-arbitrary,” in the words of Michael 
Teter,90 or “excessive” versus “permissible,” as advocated by Franita Tolson,91 is not 
likely to be easily determined. Congress may not take action on specific matters for 
a variety of reasons, and the bases underlying congressional inaction may be hard to 
uncover.92 In this respect, the approach offered here has an advantage over an across-
the-board account of congressional inaction, in that it does not submit all congres-
sional inaction to constitutional review. That only means, however, that the applica-
tion of the test will be less frequent—not that it will be clearer.93  
Fourth, the “clarity of standards” issue leads to the obvious question of enforce-
ability. Is the question of the constitutionality of congressional inaction one that 
should be resolved by the courts, or is it one in which the role of the constitutional 
claim is to inform the political rhetoric that accompanies interbranch disputes?94 
Ideally, I would suggest that, like many interbranch battles,95 the claim of unconsti-
tutionality of congressional inaction is better suited to nonjudicial resolution than 
                                                                                                                 
 
Blocks Richard Cordray Confirmation to Head Consumer Watchdog Agency, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/senate-republicans-
block-cordray-as-obama-consumer-watchdog-nominee/2011/12/08/gIQA6j9BfO_blog.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2Z4-K9E9] (“Though GOP lawmakers have praised Cordray’s 
qualifications for the job—he currently serves as the CFPB’s director of enforcement—they 
have pledged to prevent any candidate from being confirmed unless significant structural 
change are made to the bureau.”). 
 89. A more difficult question is presented by the vote on the debt ceiling. An argument 
could be made that not raising the debt ceiling would be unconstitutional because it could 
effectually force the president to take unconstitutional measures to ensure the government 
continues to function properly. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 58, at 1188.  
 90. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1475 (acknowledging the difficulty of the determination).  
 91. Tolson, supra note 23, at 2272.  
 92. One issue that might commonly arise is determining who in the Congress is respon-
sible for the inaction. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1437–38. 
 93. This is not to suggest, of course, that all constitutional standards must be clear. See 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (offering the test for personal jurisdiction 
of whether the defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise 
of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); see also 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that, in order to establish standing, the plaintiff 
must have suffered an injury in fact). 
 94. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1045 (arguing that the most “frequent and 
important” constitutional showdowns take place outside of the courts); see also Chafetz, supra 
note 6, at 769 (“In many situations, the Constitution does not dictate a stable allocation of 
decisionmaking authority; rather, it fosters the ability of the branches to engage in continual 
contestation for that authority.”). See generally James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without 
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1377 (2005).  
 95. See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for 
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 743–44 (2002) (citing the various 
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judicial enforcement. After all, asking a court to order Congress to take a specific action 
because the latter is ostensibly not doing its job is a heavy lift. Perhaps, as has been 
argued in the context of presidential appointments, a judicial decision could be 
relatively limited in scope if the only remedy sought is an order requiring Congress to 
vote on the nominee.96 However, even in this limited circumstance, I remain skeptical. 
The prospect, for example, of a court entertaining an action in the nature of a mandamus 
demanding that the Senate hold a confirmation vote seems an unlikely scenario.97 
That said, the lack of a court remedy is equally problematic. For the constitutional 
argument to have an effect in the political debate outside the courts, it must have 
political resonance. 98 But it is doubtful that the claim that congressional inaction can 
be unconstitutional will have such reverberation both because of its lack of historical 
acceptance and because of the nature of the current political climate, which seems to 
reject any norms that are not judicially imposed. A judicial ruling that congressional 
inaction can be unconstitutional, in short, may be needed to change the political cul-
ture so that claims of unconstitutional congressional inaction can have traction in the 
public debate. 
Finally, it might be argued that the approach in this Essay does not go far enough, 
and that there should be limits on congressional inaction on legislative matters as 
well as on appropriations and appointments. After all, not passing critical legislation 
can also be seriously damaging to the national interest. There is, of course, consider-
able merit to this position and, as stated previously, this Essay leaves open the ques-
tion as to whether there should be constitutional scrutiny of congressional inaction 
on matters affecting national security.99 For the most part, however, maintaining a 
rule that congressional inaction on legislative matters should not be subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny makes sense. As discussed previously, distinguishing Congress’s 
appropriations and appointments from its legislative authority follows from separa-
tion of powers principles as well as from concerns of government functionality. More 
fundamentally, however, expanding the categories of congressional powers subject 
to constitutional review too broadly undercuts one of the central purposes of this 
project, which is to promote a structure that serves to limit presidential power, as 
well as to prompt responsive congressional behavior. Opening up the argument for 
the President that the Congress may be acting unconstitutionally when it refuses to 
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and the President). 
 96. Teter, supra note 22, at 1461. 
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act on his favored legislation might simply be too much of an invitation for him to 
engage in unilateral action instead of proceeding through the legislative process.100 
That being said, there is no doubt that this concern and the other objections to the 
approach advocated in this Essay are substantial. Yet, there is also no question that 
if we are to begin to overcome the problems in constitutional governance that have 
been exposed by congressional obstruction, some new approach is needed. 
Investigating whether there are limits on Congress’s power to do nothing by refer-
ence to specific congressional powers may offer an appropriate starting point.  
CONCLUSION 
In a system of checks and balances, an essential prerogative of Congress must be 
its right to do nothing. Not confirming a President’s appointments, not passing his 
budgets, and not enacting his proposed legislation are some of the most effective 
ways that a Congress can fulfill its structural obligations and guard against executive 
branch overreach. Congressional inaction, however, can also serve to improperly em-
power the executive, as Presidents have often used congressional inaction as a justi-
fication for exerting power unilaterally. Further, congressional inaction may be 
harmful, in and of itself, as it can undercut the ability of the government to function. 
In response to these concerns, this Essay suggests that congressional inaction in 
the areas of presidential appointments and appropriations should be subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny. Congressional inaction in the area of legislation, however, should 
be deemed unobjectionable. Such an approach could serve to prod congressional ac-
tion where it is most needed, yet also limit the ability of the President to claim he has 
a right to act unilaterally on legislative matters when Congress has refused to act. As 
such, it may offer a helpful starting point in addressing the dual concerns of congres-
sional obstruction and expansive presidential power that have come to define much 
of contemporary politics. 
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